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The Commercial Activities Exception
Of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria
In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,'
the court establishes the first comprehensive test for finding jurisdiction
over a foreign state under the commercial activity exception of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act (Immunities Act).' Congress intended that
the Immunities Act provide a "comprehensive jurisdictional scheme in
cases involving foreign states" and that a "uniformity of decision" would
result.' Uniformity is desirable because disparate treatment of foreign
states might have adverse foreign policy consequences. Decisions constru-
ing the Immunities Act have so far been quite varied. In particular, inter-
pretations of the key commercial activity exception to sovereign immu-
nity' have resulted in diverse opinions. Consequently, the Texas Trading
decision is a welcome step toward a uniform construction of the Immuni-
ties Act.
I. FAcTs OF THE CASE
Seven appeals involving the Immunities Act were decided on the
same day by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Four of the appeals,
including Texas Trading, were consolidated for decision since they in-
volved similar facts.
6
As part of a massive building program, Nigeria contracted in 1975 to
buy cement from suppliers all over the world. Four of the 109 contracts
executed at that time were made with the plaintiffs, all New York corpo-
rations. Each contract called for the supplier to sell Nigeria 240,000 met-
ric tons of Portland cement and required Nigeria to establish in seller's
favor an irrevocable and confirmed letter of credit for the total amount
due. Instead of establishing confirmed letters of credit at the banks speci-
fied in the contracts, Nigeria set up irrevocable letters of credit with the
1. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sees. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6611 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
5. The three other plaintiffs in the consolidated appeal with Texas Trading were: De-
cor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc.; Chenax Majesty, Inc.; and East Europe Import-Export. The three
other appeals also decided on the same day were Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981); Reale Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330 (2d
Cir. 1981); and Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chem. & Foodstuffs, 647
F.2d 317 (2a Cir. 1981).
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Central Bank of Nigeria' and advised those letters of credit through Mor-
gan Guaranty Trust Company of New York. Nigeria chose Morgan be-
cause of a longstanding relationship between Nigeria and Morgan.!
In the summer of 1975, Nigeria began to realize it had ordered too
much cement as its port facilities could not unload the ships fast enough.'
With demurrage accruing rapidly, Nigeria cabled its suppliers and asked
them to stop sending cement. As a result, in September, Central Bank
instructed Morgan not to pay under the letters of credit unless the sup-
plier submitted a statement from Central Bank that payment ought to be
made.
The four suppliers sued Nigeria and Central Bank alleging anticipa-
tory breaches of the cement contracts and of the letters of credit. Nigeria
and Central Bank did not dispute these claims. Instead, they claimed im-
munity from the jurisdiction of American courts under the Immunities
Act. At the district court level, jurisdiction was found lacking in Texas
Trading." However, it was found present in Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, East Europe Import-Export v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, and Chenax Majesty, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nige-
ria.10 The court of appeals found jurisdiction proper in all four cases."
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
Sovereign immunity is the principle of international law that grants a
sovereign state immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of other na-
tions." The doctrine first appeared in American jurisprudence in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.1' Under the absolute theory of sover-
eign immunity, both the public and private acts of a sovereign nation are
exempt from the jurisdiction of another nation's courts."' Under the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity, suits against a foreign government
are permitted when that state is involved in commercial or business yen-
6. Central Bank is an instrumentality of the Nigerian government.
7. Central Bank used Morgan as its correspondent bank in the United States, and Mor-
gan conducted myriad transactions on Nigeria's behalf. Central Bank sent its employees to
Morgan for training and made it a regular practice to advise letters of credit through
Morgan.
8. By July 1975, 260 ships full of cement were waiting in the harbor at Lagos/Apapa to
unload.
9. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 500 F. Supp. 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
10. These three cases were consolidated for trial at the district court level. Decor by
Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
11. Thus, the district court decisions in Decor, East Europe, and Chenax were affirmed
and Texas Trading was remanded for a trial on the merits.
12. T. GUITTARI, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 9 (1970).
13. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
14. T. GIU7TrAR, supra note 12, at 9. The Schooner Exchange exempted only public
property from jurisdiction, but American courts subsequently extended immunity to a sov-
ereign's private property as well thereby making absolute sovereign immunity the standard
in American courts. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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tures.16 The Immunities Act was enacted by Congress in order to codify
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity." This act incorporates the
restrictive theory by making a general grant of immunity to foreign
states 7 and then listing exceptions to that immunity.' s The "commercial
activity" exception with which Texas Trading is concerned provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States .... 1"
Once a foreign state's activity is found to fall under any of the exceptions,
including the commercial activity exception, the federal courts have juris-
diction over the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1330.'0 Section 1330(b)
15. T. GurrrAR, supra note 12, at 9. In The Navemar, American courts began a new
policy of deference to State Department decisions as to whether sovereign immunity existed.
Compania Espahola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). The
trend begun in The Navemar became firmly accepted. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
This development was important as the Department of State, in 1952, embraced the
restrictive view of sovereign immunity through the issuance of the Tate Letter. Letter from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to Phillip B. Periman, Act-
ing Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952); also re-
printed in Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 415 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976). In
deference to the executive branch, the judiciary branch followed the Department of State's
lead. As a result, by the 1970's, the restrictive theory became the prevailing standard ac-
cepted by American courts. T. GiuTrrTAR, supra note 12, at 224.
However, application of the restrictive standard by the courts and by the Department
of State was not uniform. Furthermore, the Department of State began to realize it could
implement foreign policy with less irritation if sovereign immunity questions were decided
by the courts. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Trannational
Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 Tax. L. Rsv. 1, 11-12 (1976). Since the courts were still
bound by the Navemar line of cases, congressional action was necessary to give the courts
back the power to decide sovereign immunity questions. As a result, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act was adopted by Congress in 1976.
16. The House Report states that the Immunities Act has four main objectives: (1) To
codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity as presently recognized in interna-
tional law; (2) to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive
branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing foreign policy implications and assuring liti-
gants of a legal forum under procedures that insure due process; (3) to provide 'a statutory
procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over, foreign
states; and (4) to provide the judgment creditor with a remedy to satisfy final judgment.
Houss REPonT, supra note 3, at 6605-06.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
18. Id. §§ 1605-1607 (1.976).
19. Id. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
20. Section 1330 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
1981
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was intended as a long-arm statute,"1 and the requirement of minimum
jurisdictional contacts is embodied in 1330(b).22
III. THE Texas Trading FIVE-PART TEST
The Texas Trading court established a five-part test for finding per-
sonal jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception of the Immuni-
ties Act:
1) Does the conduct the action is based upon or related to qualify as
'commercial activity'?
2) Does that commercial activity bear the relation to the cause of
action and to the United States described by one of the three phrases
of § 1605(a)(2), warranting the Court's exercise of subject matter ju-
risdiction under § 1330(a)?
3) Does the exercise of this congresssional subject matter jurisdic-
tion lie within the permissible limits of the 'judicial power' set forth in
Article III?
4) Do subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a) and service under
§ 1608 exist, thereby making personal jurisdiction proper under §
1330(b)?
5) Does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b) comply
with the due process clause, thus making personal jurisdiction
proper?"'
This five-part test is unique. It is the first comprehensive test to deter-
mine jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception promulgated
by any court. It is also unique in separating out subject matter, personal
jurisdiction,' constitutional, and statutory questions.25
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international
agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
21. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6611.
22. The minimum contacts standard intended by Congress is that of International Shoe
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957). In addition, sections 1605-1607 themselves are intended to prescribe the neces-
sary contacts which must exist before U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
state. House REPORT, supra note 3, at 6611-12.
23. 647 F.2d at 308.
24. Two other courts before the Texas Trading decision indicated that the section
1605(a)(2) subject matter question and the section 1330(b) minimum contacts questions re-
quired separate determinations. The district court opinion in Decor, which Texas Trading
affirms, separately determined the section 1605(a)(2) direct effects question and the section
1330(b) minimum contacts question. 497 F. Supp. at 893. In addition, the Waukesha court
indicated that there should be two separate determinations. However, the minimum con-
tacts question was the only part of the analysis pursued. Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser




In the course of their decisionmaking, most courts focus on the one
element of the Immunities Act that determines the case before them. Yet,
implicit in most analyses is a two-step test which involves an initial deter-
mination of whether the activity is commercial and a subsequent determi-
nation of whether personal jurisdiction exists. In making the second de-
termination, most courts consider that if there are sufficient contacts to
satisfy the commercial activity exceptions of section 1605(a)(2), the con-
stitutional minimum contacts standards are also met.e These courts are
reading sections 1330(b) and 1606(a)(2) together. The House Report
notes that section 1605(a)(2) prescribes the necessary contacts which
must exist before American courts can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
state and that section 1330(b) incorporates these standards by refer-
ence." In addition, the House Report indicates that section 1330(b) em-
bodies the constitutional minimum contacts standards.'8 Therefore, satis-
faction of section 1605(a)(2) does not necessarily mean that the due
process clause requirements have been met.
In making the second determination, other courts have held that if
the constitutional minimum contacts standards are met, the section
1605(a)(2) standards are satisfied.'e These courts do not require a connec-
tion between at least some of the contacts and the cause of action. How-
ever, the legislative history indicates that there should be a nexus be-
tween the contacts of the foreign state with the United States and the
cause of action.' 0 The better reading of the Immunities Act and its legis-
lative history is that the requirement of sections 1605(a)(2) and 1330(b)
must be satisfied in separate analyses. This is the approach adopted by
Texas Trading.
A. Commercial Activity
The Immunities Act defines "commercial activity" as: "lE]ither a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transac-
tion or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transac-
tion or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."'
The determination of whether the foreign state's activity is commer-
cial is critical since the foreign state will be immune from jurisdiction if
25. One other court has made the distinction that subject matter jurisdiction under
article III of the Constitution must also exist before jurisdiction under the Immunities Act
can be found. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
a/f'd, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
26. See East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales v. Terra, 467 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980); and Harris
v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
27. HousE RnPosr, supra note 3, at 6611-12.
28. See note 22 supra.
29. Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
30. House REPORT, aupra note 3, at 6617.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
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the activity is sovereign. In order to reach this threshold determination,
the Texas Trading court looked to three sources as guides for ascertain-
ing the meaning of commercial activity: the legislative history of the Im-
munities Act,82 American case law prior to the passage of the Act,88 and
the current standards of international law.u Under each of these three,
Nigeria's cement contracts and letters of credit were found to qualify as
commercial activity.
The legislative history indicates that the courts should be given a
great deal of latitude in determining what is a commercial activity and
illustrates, as examples of such activity, contracts for the sale of goods
and the borrowing of money. The House Report also emphasized that it is
the nature of the act, not the foreign state's purpose in engaging in the
activity that is determinative." The Texas Trading court seemed to em-
brace these concepts.
The fact that the holding in Texas Trading relies on American case
law prior to the passage of the Immunities Act is unusual. In fact, United
Euram v. U.S.S.R." held that Victory Transport"" was superceded by the
Immunities Act. United Euram seems to be a better reasoned opinion
than Texas Trading, as the Euram court noted that the Immunities Act
focuses on the nature of the activity, not the purpose.8 Although the
Texas Trading court's reasoning seems a bit obscure, the cases cited by
the court as precedent are cited for the proposition that contracting for
the shipment of goods is commercial activity when engaged in by sover-
32. The court also relies on the Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Ad-
ministrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings] and the Hearings on H.R.
3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
-the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., let Sass. 16 (1973). These were hearings held on the first version
of the Immunities Act which was not passed by Congress.
33. The court cites Isbrandtaen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966), and Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Gen-
eral de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965).
34. The international sources relied on by the court are: The State Immunity Act 1978,
§ 3 (U.K.), reprinted in 48 HALsBuRY's STATUTES OP ENGLAND 85 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as 48 HALSBURY'S SAr'uma). Council of Europe, European Convention on State Immu-
nity, art. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra note 32, at 37-38; Claim Against The
Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. 57 (W. Ger. BVerfG 1963); and Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, (19771 Q.B. 629.
35. HousE RmPoRT, supra note 3, at 6614-15.
36. 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). According to Victory Transport,
if the foreign state's act fell into one of five categories, the state was immune from jurisdic-
tion. The five categories were: internal administrative acts, acts concerning the armed
forces, legislative acts, acts concerning diplomatic activity and public loans. 336 F.2d at 360.
38. Thus, according to Victory Transport, buying goods for a foreign state's army
would be a sovereign act. However, under the Immunities Act, it would be a commercial act.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6614-15.
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eign states."'
Of more significance, however, is Texas Trading's reliance on inter-
national sources to give content to the term "commercial activity." The
sources relied on accept the "nature" test for commercial activity' and
indicate that contracts for the supply of goods and financial arrangements
are commercial activities." In general, the test for commercial activity to
be deduced from these sources is whether the foreign state has exercised
its sovereign authority or acted as a private person."2
The use of international sources is a desirable step since sovereign
immunity decisions often have political ramifications. Thus, one court has
indicated that "commercial activity" should be defined narrowly so as to
"keep the courts away from those areas that touch very closely upon the
sensitive nerves of foreign countries." ' Another court has noted that
"commercial activity" need not be narrowly construed." Yet, it is desira-
ble to define the term as most countries operating under the restrictive
theory define it. Perhaps those "sensitive nerves" will not be avoided, but
the decisions of the U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction will be backed by
a consensus of world opinion.46
Although not specifically stated by the court, the Texas Trading test
for commercial activity synthesized from all these sources seems to be:
Presuming that contracts for the sale of goods are commercial activities,
is the activity one in which a private person could engage?
B. Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Direct Effects Clause
The Texas Trading court found subject matter jurisdiction under the
39. All the cases listed in note 33 supra involved the shipment of grain.
40. See Claim Against the Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. 57 (W. Ger. BVerfG 1963).
41. For instance, section 3 of the State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom defines
"commercial transaction" as:
(3)(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guaran-
tee or indemnity in respect of any such action or of any other financial obliga-
tion; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial,
financial, professional or other similar character) into which a State enters or
in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority ....
48 HALSUaRv'S STATUTES at' 90.
42. See Claim Against the Empire of Iran, 45 I.L.R. at 80.
43. OPEC v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 567
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
44. In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), decided sub-
sequently to Texas Trading, takes the position that "regular course of commercial activity"
should be construed broadly to give those aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign access
to American courts.
45. Thus, the finding in Texas Trading that Nigeria was engaged in commercial activ-
ity was based in part on the fact that other courts of the world had uniformly found Nige-
ria's cement purchases to be a commercial activity.
1981
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'O
direct effects clause of section 1605(a)(2).'6 In so doing, the court con-
strued the phrase "direct effect in the United States" as requiring two
determinations: (1) whether there was a "direct effect" on the plaintiff
and (2) whether the effect occurred "in the United States." The court
found no guidance from Congress' suggestions that the clause be con-
strued consistently with the principles of section 18 of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law41 and that the clause might be intended as a long-
arm statute.48 However, the court did rely on previous decisions, in par-
ticular Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow," Upton v. Empire of Iran,60
and Carey v. National Oil Corp."1 Harris" and Upton" together seem to
establish that a direct effect is one which is substantial, foreseeable and
immediate with no intervening elements. Carey stands for the principle
that the breach of a contract is such a direct effect. Thus, in a corporate
setting, Texas Trading found that a direct effect is a financial loss. Con-
sequently, Nigeria's breaches of the cement contracts or breaches of the
letters of credit were deemed by the court to be direct effects since the
breaches resulted in financial losses to the four plaintiffs.
The court found that failure to pay an American corporation triggers
the statutory language "in the United States."' In interpreting this stat-
utory language, the court examined the above-referenced cases and other
state cases for guidelines. However, the search did not reveal a suitable
46. The direct effects clause provides: "A foreign state shall not be immune ... in any
case ... in which the action is based . . . upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
47. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. The Restatement provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either
(b)(i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substan-
tial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 18 (1965).
48. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6611-12.
49. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
50. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), af'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
51. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. Harris relies on the Restatement to arrive at this test for "direct effect." 481 F.
Supp. at 1062-63.
53. Upton relies on an analogy of the Immunities Act to the District of Columbia's
long-arm statute to arrive at its definition of "direct effect." 459 F. Supp. at 266.
54. The court did not make a ruling whether failure to pay a foreign corporation in the
United States or to pay an American corporation abroad would be "in the United States."
In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), decided subsequently
to Texas Trading, held that an American corporation injured overseas incurs a direct effect
in the United States if it suffers financial loss as a result of that injury. Rio Grande Trans-




standard. The court appeared to be concerned with the question of access
to the courts for parties aggrieved by the commercial activities of a for-
eign state. It was the intent of Congresss that such access be provided to
private litigants. As the "direct effect" and "in the United States" clauses
are open to many interpretations, the ultimate question should be:
"[Wias the effect sufficiently 'direct' and sufficiently 'in the United
States' that Congress would have wanted an American court to hear the
case?"""
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that any borderline
cases would be decided in favor of allowing litigation to proceed. Accord-
ingly, the Texas Trading court asserted broader jurisdiction under the
direct effects clause than any prior court.57 Since effects jurisdiction is not
widely accepted in the world, such a broad assertion of effects jurisdiction
over foreign states might be harmful to our foreign policy."
C. Article III Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Since each of the four cases is between a New York corporation and a
foreign state, diversity of citizenship exists and article III of the Constitu-
tion is satisfied69 Therefore, the federal courts properly have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in these four cases.60
D. Statutory Personal Jurisdiction
Statutory personal jurisdiction under section 1330(b) exists if section
1330(a) is satisfied and if service of process has been made pursuant to
section 1608. Both conditions have been met in these four cases, so statu-
tory personal jurisdiction over Nigeria and Central Bank was found to be
proper by the court.
55. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at.6605-06.
56. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 313.
57. Prior to Texas Trading, the Decor district court had found jurisdiction to exist
under the direct effects clause. The court in Maritime Int'l v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F.
Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1981), decided just shortly before Texas Trading, found jurisdiction as
well, but Guinea had agreed to arbitration. This agreement to arbitration was found to be a
waiver of jurisdiction by the Maritime court.
58. However, the minimum contacts requirements must also be satisfied before per.
sonal jurisdiction can actually be asserted. This may limit the instances when jurisdiction
will be found to exist.
59. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States;. . . to
controversies. . . between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States .... "
60. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), a case
decided the same day as Texas Trading, a suit between an alien corporation and a foreign
state was dismissed for lack of diversity. The Immunities Act was not considered by the
court a "law" for the purposes of article III since it is simply a procedural, not a substantive
statute. Although constitutional subject matter jurisdiction was not found, statutory subject
matter jurisdiction was found to exist.
1981
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E. Due Process Analysis
The Texas Trading court began by examining whether foreign states
are "persons" within the meaning of the due process clause. The court
found that prior case law indicates that foreign states are persons.6" Con-
sequently, the minimum contacts standards of International Shoe" and
its progeny must be met before jurisdiction can be exercised over a for-
eign state.
The court then turned to the questions of "whose contacts?" and
"with what?" The answer to the latter is the foreign state's contacts with
the United States. This conclusion is reached because of the similarity of
the service of process provision of the Immunities Actss and those of the
antitrust and securities laws"4 which have been interpreted to allow juris-
diction to be exercised on the basis of contacts with the United States."
Most other courts interpreting the Immunities Act and which have con-
sidered the "with what?" question have concluded that contacts any-
where in the United States are jurisdictionally relevant, and have not lim-
ited the contacts to just those within the forum state."
The answer to the "whose contacts?" question is the contacts of the
defendant foreign state and those of its agents. The court's test for
agency in this context is whether the agent "provides services beyond
'mere solicitation' and these services are sufficiently important to the for-
eign [state] that if it did not have a representative to perform them the
[state's] own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar
services." 67 Using this test, the Texas Trading court found Central
Bank's activities attributable to Nigeria and Morgan's activities attribu-
table to both since the entire payment mechanism would have collapsed
without Morgan's performance. The attribution of an agent's contacts to
the principal has been held appropriate by other courts looking at what
contacts satisfy the minimum contacts standard under the Immunities
Act."
In order to assess how numerous the foreign state's contacts must be
to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, the court adopted the In-
61. See Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980); Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979); Purdy Co. v. Argen., 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964);
T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Wheat Flour, 399 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Ala. 1975); and
Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Rom., 403 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. 111. 1975).
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ternational Shoe standard: "[Mlaintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "" In addition,
the line of cases after International Shoe interpreting the minimum con-
tacts required to satisfy the due process clause were relied on.70 Using
these precedents, the court established four tests to judge whether a for-
eign state's contacts with the United States are adequate to satisfy due
process requirements: (1) to what extent did the defendants avail them-
selves of the privileges of American law;. (2) to what extent was litigation
in the United States foreseeable to the defendants; (3) the inconvenience
to the defendants of litigating in the United States; and (4) the counter-
vailing interest of the United States in hearing the suit.
71
Applying these tests, the court found that Nigeria repeatedly and
purposefully availed itself of the privileges of American law because of its
extensive financial dealings with Morgan. New York law protected Nige-
ria in each of its transactions. Furthermore, because of its extensive busi-
ness dealings with Morgan, Nigeria could have foreseen litigating in New
York. The frequent visits to New York by Central Bank officials and Ni-
geria's worldwide business dealings negate any assertion by Nigeria that
litigating in New York would be inconvenient. Finally, the Immunities
Act was passed to provide access to the courts, and the United States has
expressed a strong interest in providing a forum for such cases. Therefore,
Nigeria's relation to the forum satisfied the due process clause
requirements.
Court interpretations of what are the proper minimum contacts stan-
dards under the Immunities Act have been varied. Some interpretations
have relied on an International Shoe analysis, although only one other
court besides the Texas Trading court has established a specific set of
guidelines." Other courts have looked to long-arm statutes for guidance
since section 1330(b) is patterned after the District of Columbia's long-
arm statute.7 8 In addition, other courts analyze differently the contacts
required to satisfy clauses one, two and three of section 1605(a)(2).'
4
69. 326 U.S. at 316.
70. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior
Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); and McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
71. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
72. Texas Trading affirms the Decor decision which did set up a three-factor test. De-
cor, 49'7 F. Supp. at 1007.
73. Courts taking this approach rely on the District of Columbia's long-arm statute or
their local long-arm statutes to set minimum contacts standards. The reliance on local long-
arm statutes seems especially misplaced since Congress intended a uniform national stah-
dard. Although reliance on the District of Columbia's long-arm statute is probably appropri-
ate because of the legislative history, most courts using this standard have failed to include
an additional constitutional contacts analysis. Application of constitutional standards is
called for by the legislative history and, of course, constitutional standards should always be
applied.
74. See East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
and Chicago Bridge &*Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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Much of the confusion and diversity has resulted because these other
courts do not separate their analyses of subject matter and personal juris-
diction questions. Since Texas Trading does analyze these questions sep-
arately, uniform minimum contacts standards can be applied in all cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
After an exhaustive analysis of jurisdiction under the commercial ac-
tivity exception to the Immunities Act, the Texas Trading court devel-
oped a unique five-part test. This test separates the subject matter, per-
sonal jurisdiction, statutory, and constitutional questions, while providing
standards for each part of the test. The Texas Trading test should pro-
vide needed uniformity in a substantial number of decisions involving the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states. Thus, Texas Trading's elabo-
ration of specific guidelines will give needed definition to the minimum
contacts standard in the context of the Immunities Act.
The court noted throughout the opinion that access to the courts is
the determinative factor in a decision to exercise jurisdiction. This liberal
attitude has been embraced by a New York federal district court in In re
Rio Grande Transport.5 The Rio Grande Transport court repeatedly
emphasized the concern of Congress that those aggrieved by the commer-
cial acts of a foreign sovereign should be given a forum. Thus, the Texas
Trading five-part test seems destined to lead to a uniform but broad ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns by the New York federal
courts.
Wannell Baird
EMS Currency Rates Realigned
The European Monetary System (EMS) is the European Commu-
nity's mechanism for linking the currencies of West Germany, France, It-
aly, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in a
joint float against the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.' By promot-
ing stable exchange rates, the EMS seeks to integrate and harmonize the
75. In re Rio Grande Transport, 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
1. For an in-depth discussion of the European Monetary System, see Development, The
European Monetary System and the European Currency Unit, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'v
175 (1980). See also Rey, The European Monetary System, 17 CoMm. MKT. L. Rav. 7
(1980).
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